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Concerns about equity and justice1 have become prominent in debates about conservation. 
These concerns include questions about how we distribute costs, benefits, rights and 
responsibilities, questions about how we give voice to different cultures and beliefs, and 
questions about how we make trade-offs between current and future people, between 
individual rights and the greater good, and between humans and non-humans (Brechin et al. 
2002, Norton 2003, Shoreman-Ouimet and Kopnina 2015). Working to improve 
‘conservation justice’ is considered ethically desirable, but also instrumental to improved 
conservation effectiveness because it reduces the likelihood of conflict (Martin et al. 2013, 
Pascual et al. 2014, Suiseeya 2014) or improves participation (Coolsaet 2015). But 
determining what constitutes ‘conservation justice’ is not easy. It is not enough to consult 
national or international laws to determine what is just because it is often perfectly legal to 
subject people to harms arising from pollution, deforestation, climate change, or indeed 
harms arising from the establishment of protected areas (Smith Mark J and Pangsapa 2008). 
Thus conservation has to look beyond the judiciary for its moral compass. 
This paper contributes to understanding what this moral compass should look like: how 
should we frame our thinking about conservation justice? In doing so it particularly 
highlights the need to incorporate the dimension of recognition. Contemporary academic 
framings of environmental justice tend to use a tripartite typology of concerns: distribution, 
procedure and recognition (Schlosberg 2004, Sikor 2013, Walker 2012). Distribution refers to 
differences between stakeholders in terms of who enjoys rights to material benefits and who 
bears costs and responsibilities. Procedure refers to how decisions are made, who participates 
and on what terms. Recognition is typically concerned with respecting identities and cultural 
difference (Fraser and Honneth 2003); it is about the extent to which different agents, ideas 
and cultures are respected and valued in interpersonal encounters and in public discourse and 
practice. We focus on recognition because we think it is highly relevant to conservation 
conflicts and because it is comparatively poorly understood and neglected. 
                                                          
1 We use ‘equity’ with reference to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) because this is the term used 
in that process. For much of the rest of the paper we prefer to use ‘justice’ as it better incorporates our focus on 
‘recognition’.  Environmental ‘justice’ tends to refer to an enlarged set of concerns, including distribution and 
participation, but also incorporating calls for cultural recognition, a dimension of justice that passes largely 
unnoticed in equity discussions, and which we think should be brought into the foreground more clearly.  
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It is not pragmatic to seek a single definition of justice-as-recognition because this would 
ignore important differences in understanding, including amongst political philosophers. 
Instead we find it a necessary first step to provide a roadmap to the plural ways in which 
recognition has been understood, both in theory and in practice, and to relate this to 
contemporary conservation conflicts. Our approach is therefore to describe different 
traditions of thinking and to illustrate these through case studies. We then proceed to a 
synthesis discussion in which we explore how elements of common spirit or intent can be 
drawn together in order to make key aspects of the concept of recognition legible to 
conservation practice. Prior to this, we briefly review recent attention to justice within 
conservation practice. 
 
2. Conservation practice, justice and recognition 
Biodiversity conservation is linked with recognition injustices for three main reasons. Firstly, 
protected areas (PAs) are spatially associated with cultural diversity (Gorenflo et al. 2012, 
Stepp et al. 2004) and with people whose knowledge and environmental governance 
institutions are vulnerable to being marginalised (Brosius and Hitchner 2010, Escobar A. 
1998). Secondly, mainstream conservation management strategies are influenced by 
culturally specific (and often disputed) ideas about what works and about what counts as 
evidence of what works.  For example conservation approaches have been driven by the 
assumed superiority of exclusionary models of protected areas in which people are separated 
from the rest of nature (Lele et al. 2010, West et al. 2006). Thirdly, these dominant blueprints 
about how conservation should be done become a basis for the misrepresentation and 
misrecognition of indigenous and local people.  For example, the ‘Yosemite model’ of 
conservation, in which nature is conceived as wilderness, has led to the representation of 
local and indigenous lifestyles as harmful to nature conservation (Cronon 1996, Dowie 2009, 
Stevens 1997). Given the powerful assumption that conservation holds the moral high 
ground, these lifestyles are also therefore portrayed as morally inferior (Martin et al. 2013, 
Neumann 2004). But biodiversity conservation can also work constructively with local 
communities, especially if it embraces the concept of recognition. Where innovative, non-
exclusionary models are developed, indigenous people have sometimes embraced protected 
areas as a way to positively promote both their territories and traditions (Stevens 1997). 
The language of equity and rights has been in global conservation discourse since at least the 
early 1970s (UNEP 1972). In the 1980s, ideas of inter- and intra-generational equity were 
foundational to popular narratives of sustainable development (WCED 1987) that fed into the 
first ‘Earth Summit’ in 1992. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was one of the 
outcomes of this summit and builds on three objectives: ‘the conservation of biological 
diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources’ (Art. 1). The 2010 Nagoya Protocol 
develops the third objective of access and benefit sharing (ABS) whilst ‘taking into account 
the important role of traditional knowledge’ (Secretariat of the CBD 2010, preamble). The 
inclusion of equitable ABS is something that was pushed for by developing country 
stakeholders who feared a highly preservationist CBD and expected financial returns from the 
exploitation of their genetic resources and traditional knowledge (Broggiato et al. 2015). 
However, it is worth noting that both the process and implementation of the CBD and its 
Nagoya Protocol have led to controversies over recognition. One charge is that the CBD and 
Nagoya are culturally dominating, requiring prospective beneficiaries to assimilate imposed 
ideas of what is fair and equitable as a condition of benefiting (De Jonge 2011, Suiseeya 
2014, Whiteman 2009). For example, the San people are expected to conform to norms of fair 
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procedure rooted in western principles of representative democracy in order to negotiate an 
ABS agreement related to the Hoodia plant (Vermeylen and Walker 2011). 
With regard to its first two objectives, the CBD pays attention to cultural diversity and the 
identity of indigenous peoples in the much-quoted Articles 8j and 10c which respectively 
demand that Parties to the Convention protect indigenous and local communities’ knowledge, 
practices and lifestyles relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. 
Nevertheless, Parties to the Convention have time and again adopted policies that conflict 
with traditional ethics of stewardship of nature, notably with regard to the so-called 
“marketisation” of nature. An outstanding example is Decision 30 on “Incentive Measures” 
taken at COP-11 of the CBD which strongly encourages Parties to include the economic 
valuation of nature in their national conservation programmes. Such approaches are regularly 
resisted by indigenous peoples’ representatives but gain more and more traction with 
governments.  
One of the overriding criticisms of existing global attempts to formalise aspects of 
conservation equity would seem to be the lack of recognition of other cultures and other ways 
of thinking about justice in relation to the environment. Without attention to the equal status 
of others’ ways of seeing the world, attempts to define conservation justice are likely to 
reproduce dominant (western) conceptions about what constitutes equitable distribution, 
procedure and recognition. Such a concern is not confined to state representatives at global 
forums. At Nagoya, conservation NGOs were seen to align with the interests of states, 
pressing to bypass discussion of foundational questions about how conservation justice is to 
be defined (Suiseeya 2014). In conservation planning and practice, recognition has not 
featured centrally either. Biodiversity conservation programs have largely been informed by 
scientific principles, and have thus targeted nationally representative ecosystems, taking 
account of species rarity and diversity, recreational value, and level of threat (Margules et al. 
2002). Conservation has historically been characterised by territorial and natural resource 
management conflicts, where distinct values and interests collide. For example, the move 
toward people-centred conservation since the 1980s has rendered mixed results and made 
evident how difficult it can be to reconcile the ideas and aspirations of conservation 
practitioners with those of local people and other actors (Adams et al. 2004, Wells et al. 
1992). As of today, conservation is still marked by a lack of willingness to engage fully with 
different and changing beliefs about nature, or to explore diverse, culturally-suited 
implementation approaches instead of relying on blueprints (Reyers et al. 2010). 
 
3. Thinking about recognition in conservation justice 
Whilst we are arguing for more concerted consideration for recognition within conservation 
practice, we also acknowledge that its application remains difficult, not least because of 
contested meanings and approaches. The main contribution of this paper is therefore to shed 
light on these differences and to reveal common, core concerns that can serve as a basis for 
progress. In doing so we draw on four contributory schools of thinking: Hegel’s theory of 
recognition, critical theory, decolonial theory and the capabilities approach (all defined 
below). There is considerable theoretical overlap between the first three of these, but we 
separate them analytically because they are distinct in terms of the scholars using them, their 
geographical focus, and the kind of responses they call for. We employ a simple conceptual 
framework that decomposes these approaches to defining recognition into four components: 
subjects, harms, mechanisms and responses.  
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Subjects of justice refers to the stakeholders or users who are entitled to moral 
consideration: those who hold rights and deserve recognition (Sikor et al. 2014). One 
debate is about the spatial and temporal scope of responsibility and the extent to 
which we can bear moral responsibility for those in distant states, or for those not yet 
born. Moral concern for future generations is almost a defining feature of 
environmental justice (Dobson 2003) and despite some scholars’ difficulties of 
asserting responsibility across national boundaries (Nagel 2005, Rawls 1971), 
recognition theorists now tend to argue that we are global citizens with global 
responsibilities (Fraser 2009, Honneth 2014, Young 2010). A second debate pits 
individualism against communitarianism. Liberal traditions of justice tend to prioritise 
the individual as the subject of justice, whilst communitarians argue that communities 
can also be harmed and therefore deserve recognition (Sandel 1998, Schlosberg and 
Carruthers 2010). Such communitarian ethics also feature strongly in African and 
Latin American indigenous philosophies (Biko 1998, López 2013). A third debate 
concerns expanding the reach of moral responsibility to embrace non-humans 
(Nussbaum 2007, Schlosberg 2013, Singer 1995). Finally, moral responsibility 
towards the spiritual world is central to many Latin American indigenous peoples’ 
notions of environmental justice (e.g. de Castro 2012). 
Harms are the kinds of injustices suffered by moral subjects and can vary according 
to the dimension of environmental justice. Distributive injustice is more likely to 
result in objective material harm such as impoverishment whilst misrecognition tends 
to be linked with harms to subjective wellbeing such as reduced self-esteem. 
However, we will see that there is an important debate about whether the harms from 
misrecognition are purely subjective and psychological, or whether they are 
inextricably bound up with material harms.  
Mechanisms refer here to the institutional and structural explanations for injustices. 
How can we explain how similar injustices appear repeatedly, in different places and 
times? Very broadly speaking, causal explanations fall into ideational  and material 
camps: Either one argues that the roots of oppression are found in the realm of ideas 
and culture, or that they are found in  in the economic structures of society (Atkinson 
1991, Parsons 2007). But there are also middle positions, in which cultural and 
economic forces  are viewed as operating in tandem (Coulthard 2007).  
Responses. Finally, it is inevitable that traditions that identify different harms and 
mechanisms will also propose different solution frameworks. For some, responses can 
start with individual efforts at self-development, such as recognizing one’s 
connectedness to the rest of nature (e.g. Naess and Rothenberg 1990). For others, a 
more political project is required, such as extending participatory democracy (Dryzek 
2000, Sen 2009), redefining national constitutions to allow plural notions of 
citizenship (Walsh 2007), or giving voice to alternatives to capitalism such as 
degrowth and Buen Vivir2 (Escobar Arturo 2015). 
 
                                                          
2 The literal translation of Buen Vivir in Quechua and Aymara languages is “To Live in Plenitude”.  It refers to a 
contemporary non-capitalist ideology that has recently blossomed in South America with roots in indigenous 
and non-western conceptions of human welfare and of nature. Buen Vivir is a holistic concept rooted in 
principles and values such as harmony, equilibrium and complementarity, which from an indigenous perspective 




Table 1 summarises these four components of environmental justice for four traditions of 
thinking about recognition: Hegelianism, critical theory, decolonialism and capabilities. We 
now proceed to discuss each of these in turn. 
 
Table 1. Summary of different schools of thinking about recognition 
 Hegelianism Critical theory 
 










































































public debate.  
 
3.1 Hegelianism and recognition 
The German philosopher Georg Hegel (1770-1831) is considered the founder of the 
continental European ethics of recognition. Hegel conceived the struggle against injustice – 
indeed the whole history of humanity’s struggle for freedom – in terms of an essential need to 
be recognised and respected by others. For Hegel, such recognition is deemed essential 
because it is the basis of individual freedom. Failure to respect important constituents of a 
person’s cultural identity, such as their beliefs about nature, is a denial of their freedom of 
thought and freedom to live according to their chosen belief system. Such freedoms are 
protected today in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 2007 UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. For example, the latter requires parties to 
recognize “the right of all peoples to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be 




One of the most important insights from Hegel is that human freedom cannot be achieved 
unilaterally but only through social relationships of a psychological nature. Such relationships 
can be described as ‘inter-subjective’ interactions inevitably occur between persons who are 
more and less powerful. For Hegel, recognition injustice was a form of enslavement that 
occurred through unequal encounters in which the more powerful actor fails to recognize the 
value of the other. The critical point here is that a person can only really value their own life 
if they see that others value such a life. For example, it is not possible to have high self-
esteem if you perceive that others treat you with contempt. One’s psychological sense of 
worth is formed by how others act towards you; or put more fundamentally, one’s freedom is 
achieved or denied through psychological encounters with others. This is very relevant to 
biodiversity conservation because a person might only be able to enjoy cultural freedom if 
their ways of knowing and living with nature are respected by others.  
 
The denial of recognition leads to fundamental harms of a psychological nature.  Fanon 
(1967) saw such psychological harm as fundamental to the lasting injustices of colonialism in 
Africa. Others consider such psychological harms to contribute to the health problems faced 
by some indigenous peoples today (Ohenjo et al. 2006). If we accept such a characterisation 
of harm and injustice, some difficult questions are posed for a more just conservation. How, 
for example should conservation proceed in states, such as Rwanda, that continue with 
assimilationist policies towards indigenous and local peoples (Dawson and Martin 2015, 
Ohenjo et al. 2006)?  
 
For Hegel the mechanism of subjugation was psychological and the required response was 
to move relations towards more reciprocal recognition. In contemporary terms, this is a call 
for multiculturalism, which involves affirmative attempts to revalue previously denigrated 
cultures. As becomes clear below, we are sceptical that such a change in social encounters is 
sufficient in the absence of an accompanying transformation of underlying economic and 
political powers. But by the same measure, we should conclude that economic reforms (such 
as access and benefit sharing or payments for ecosystem services) are equally unlikely to 
achieve justice without accompanying attention to intersubjective relationships. For Fanon 
(1967) for example, the end of direct colonial economic and political rule was not sufficient 
to emancipate Africans from the internalised sense of inferiority that had been forced upon 
them. 
 
3.2 Critical theory and recognition 
 
Critical theory is a neo-Marxist school of thought characterised by its emancipatory 
ambitions and by its alignment with prevailing social movements (Fraser 1985, Horkheimer 
1982). In the past, such movements have been dominated by calls for economic redistribution 
to resolve class-based injustices. But in the late 20th century there emerged new social 
movements linked to cultural identity struggles (Habermas 1981), including indigenous 
peoples movements and elements of environmentalism. Whilst old social movements 
struggled for more just division of resources, new ones engage in ‘indivisible conflicts’ 
arising over goods for which distribution makes little sense, such as ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’ 
(Honneth 2004). Fraser develops a theoretical framing that attends to both old and new 
struggles, framing injustice in terms of inter-twined cultural and economic forces. She 
proposes that a critical theory of recognition needs to reveal ‘the ways in which economic 





A critical theory approach to recognition does not obviously differ in terms of the subjects of 
justice it identifies, but differs fundamentally from a Hegelian account of recognition in terms 
of the nature of harms, the mechanisms by which these are produced, and putative solution 
frameworks. For Fraser, misrecognition is about social mechanisms which produce status 
differences that harm the opportunities of some social groups. Societies develop hierarchies 
of cultural values that degrade the status of some groups of people, thereby culturally 
subordinating them and denying equality of social interaction. Such status injustices are 
reproduced through formal institutions, such as property laws that discriminate against 
indigenous forms of tenure, or against women, but also through informal institutions 
including cultural norms and prejudices. 
 
Fraser reconciles this observation about cultural status with more traditional Marxist 
economic analysis, identifying twin mechanisms that produce injustices. Injustices arise out 
of a combination of economic exploitation and cultural subordination, neither of which can 
be analytically subsumed under the other (Fraser 1995, Fraser and Honneth 2003). Gender 
inequality for example has connected roots in both economic arrangements (e.g. rules of 
resource access) and culture (Robeyns 2003, Young 2010). Responses to these status-based 
harms need to be multi-dimensional. As with Hegelian thinking, there is a need for 
affirmative efforts to tackle cultural misrecognition (Fraser 2000). But to achieve parity of 
participation there is also a need to transform institutions that define distribution and political 
representation (Fraser 2009). 
 
Fraser’s struggle of choice is feminism and she has not herself addressed issues of 
environmental justice. Nevertheless, her combined focus on recognition and distribution 
appears fruitful for a critical theory of conservation justice. Firstly, economic inequalities are 
often considered to be drivers of biodiversity loss, both through mechanisms of 
impoverishment of some groups that undermine sustainable practices, and the corresponding 
enrichment of others that fuels profligate consumption. Secondly, however, this is only ever 
part of the story (Roe and Elliott 2005) because material practices are entwined with status 
inequalities and political marginalisation. Our first case study, below, illustrates the ways in 
which failures of recognition serve to undermine traditional knowledge and cultures whilst 
also highlighting how such cultural subjugation operates in tandem with forms of political 
and economic inequality. 
 
Case Study 1: Seeding recognition in France 
AgroBio Perigord (ABP) is an association for the development of organic farming in 
Dordogne, a department in southwestern France. Among other things, ABP is known for its 
activities of in situ conservation of local and regional plant landraces threatened by genetic 
erosion (called ‘conservation varieties’ or ‘peasant varieties’). It is a key member of the 
nation-wide Peasant Seed Network (‘Réseau Semences Paysanne’), and hosts a community 
seedbank (‘Maison de la Semence’) for both professional farmers and home gardeners.  
In 2000, the founding members of ABP started gathering and reusing local plant landraces as 
an act of resistance to the use of so-called ‘elite’ varieties (commercial pure lines or F1 
hybrids). Under the banner of ‘peasant farming’ (‘agriculture paysanne’), a term previously 
restricted to subsistence agriculture in the global South (Ploeg 2009), the underlying struggle 
aims at the cultural recognition of small-scale, farmer-driven agriculture, through the 
reintroduction of local landraces. But local landraces are useless without the associated local 
agroecological knowledge and practice, which had been largely lost since the emergence of 
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industrial agriculture in Western Europe in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Therefore, in 2001, ABP launched a participatory plant-breeding program to select and 
multiply environment-specific breeds and foster the conservation of local plant landraces 
through their utilization. In order to reacquire know-how and breeding techniques, each 
farmer breeds a certain amount of local landraces on a testing parcel, and commits to multiply 
and return two-thirds of the initial amount of seed to the community seedbank. Through peer-
based ‘farm-talks’, participatory plant breeding takes the form of the social learning platform 
in which farmer-driven knowledge not only gains ‘scientific’ recognition, but is also enriched 
through the active participation of other local farmers and partner scientists. On top of 
cultural and scientific recognition, the association also claims legal recognition. As the use of 
peasant varieties is currently unregulated under French law, they are considered 
‘phytogenetic resources’, which can only be exchanged for experimental purposes. The 
domination of corporate seed remains protected by a system of Plant Variety Rights that 
leaves alternative seed users legally invisible. 
Historically, the creation of ABP was triggered by the reaction of local farmers to having 
been sold ‘organic’ maize seed that had been contaminated with genetically modified genes. 
But the re-emergence of peasant agriculture is also part of a broader opposition to the way in 
which the agricultural economy is organized. Agricultural policy serves the interest of a 
market-only logic, and the sector is characterized by multinational companies’ increasing 
control over agronomic research (Bonneuil and Thomas 2009).  
The conservation activities undertaken by ABP should therefore be seen as a combination of 
struggles for the recognition of farmers and for more economic equality. Justice claims take 
on a combined character, denouncing both the socio-cultural subordination of small-scale 
farmers and their economic exploitation by the dominant agri-food system (Coolsaet 2015). 
In 2011, ABP co-signed the declaration of the European Forum on agricultural biodiversity 
“Let’s Liberate Diversity”, adopted in Szeged, Hungary. It demanded of “the European 
Union and all of its Member States recognition that European farmers are also contributing to 
the conservation of plant genetic resources” and that policies “take into account the right to 
food sovereignty [...] the right to preserve local cultural heritage,” and the right of farmers to 
freely define their farming practices. 
 
3.3. Decolonial thought and recognition 
Decolonial thinking has roots in both Hegelianism and critical theory, emphasising forms of 
inter-subjective, social, cultural and political subordination that deny freedom and 
opportunity to some groups. However, it is also distinct for its focus on the global South and 
for identifying mechanisms of subordination in Eurocentric scientific and political 
worldviews. Proponents of this school of thought are largely from Latin America (Escobar 
Arturo 2007, Leff 2001, Mignolo 2008, Quijano 2000), but also from India (Visvanathan 
1997), Portugal (Santos et al. 2007, Santos 2010) and New Zealand (Smith Linda Tuhiwai 
1999) among others. 
According to this body of theory colonialism ended when the global South gained political 
independence. However, ‘coloniality’ is a process of subjugation that persists through the 
expansion of a European cultural worldview. This dominating European culture is 
institutionalised through education, the media, state-sanctioned languages and behavioural 
norms. Thus, coloniality is a mechanism of recognition injustice that creates structural 
oppression over marginalized sectors of society whose alternative worldviews become 
devalued and stigmatised. Decoloniality scholarship is inspired by indigenous peoples’ 
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movements and their struggles against modernity (Mignolo 2008). It therefore has links to 
indigenous cosmogonies, leading to conceptions of justice subjects that emphasize 
community over individuals (López 2013) and includes moral responsibilities towards mother 
nature and intangible beings such as spirits.  
Decoloniality argues that forced assimilation to modernity leads to profound psychological 
harms to indigenous peoples, eroding vital conditions for their wellbeing such as cultural 
identity, freedom of belief, and self-respect. But coloniality also leads to more tangible 
impacts on status and participation by disregarding local notions of authority and territory, 
frequently resulting in displacement or enforced change to livelihoods. Decolonial theories 
describe mechanisms of harm that resemble those of Fraser’s critical theory. Accordingly, 
psychological and physical harm is perpetuated through through political and economic 
power which operating in connection with knowledge-based discursive power produce harms 
to identities and subjective being. Thus, responses to coloniality necessarily involve 
decolonizing power, knowledge and being. This involves moving away from a unitary model 
of citizenship and civilization to one that respects different local economies, politics, cultures, 
epistemologies and forms of knowledge.   
Conservation practice is primarily linked to the coloniality of knowledge, because it forms 
part of a dominant form of knowledge production (western science), institutionalised within 
bodies such as the CBD, which has marginalized local forms of knowledge (Visvanathan 
1997, Santos 2010). Thus, responding to conservation injustices must include democratizing 
science itself by creating opportunities for intercultural dialogues as part of the knowledge 
production process (Walsh 2007). Case study two explores how this means prioritizing the 
indigenous world view and its concerns ‘and then coming to know and understand theory and 
research’ from that perspective (Smith 1999).  
 
Case Study 2: Pluricultural politics, Intercultural dialogues and Cognitive Justice in 
Canaima National Park, Venezuela 
Canaima National Park is located in southeastern Venezuela, near the border with Brazil and 
Guyana, and inside the ancestral territory of the Pemon Indigenous Peoples. Since the park 
was established, the Pemon have been in conflict with environmental authorities and have 
made claims for territorial rights and self-determination. Tensions arose due to conflicting 
land use demands and because the park was established on ancestral territory without 
consultation or local consent. With an estimated population of 20,000, many Pemon still 
maintain their traditional system of scattered nuclear family settlements. Their lifestyle is 
based largely on traditional activities: agriculture, fishing, hunting and gathering, although 
there is more and more work in tourism and, for the younger generation, public posts. 
The Park’s designation has helped protect the Pemon’s territory, but they still view it as a 
threat to their existence. This is a result of a style of environmental management and 
development planning which has failed to recognise the area's cultural value for the Pemon, 
their environmental knowledge or their notions of authority and territory (Rodriguez 2014). 
One area of conflict is the traditional practices of slash and burn agriculture and savannah 
burning that are considered a threat to watershed and soil conservation by park managers. 
There are also conflicting views about how to manage the influx of tourists into the Park and 
how to distribute the corresponding benefits, and conflicts over projects of strategic interest 
for the Venezuelan Government, such as the building of a high-voltage power line to export 
electricity to Brazil (1997-2000), and the installation of a satellite sub-base (2007).  
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Misrecognition has been at the core of all conflicts, which the Pemon have dealt with by 
resorting to a variety of strategies, including silent resistance (in the case of fire use practices) 
and more overt ones. In the case of tourism and large scale development this has included 
direct violence, law suits and political and social mobilization, which in the particular case of 
the power-line conflict, unfolded into a national indigenous movement demanding 
constitutional changes to the nation state to incorporate legal rights to cultural difference. 
This was achieved in 1999 with a new national constitution in which Venezuela became a 
pluri-cultural state. 
Since the mid-1990s, and to cope with conflicts and rapid cultural change, the Pemon have 
been developing their own “Life Plan”, the ideological, spiritual and philosophical foundation 
to visualize and define a desired future, based on reconstructing their history and cultural 
identity. An imperative to move forward in constructing a Pemon Life Plan has been 
developing capacities and participatory methodologies for community analysis and planning. 
For this purpose, they have been supported by a series of collaborations with external actors 
who have incorporated the “Life Plan” agenda within their research projects, thereby 
generating opportunities for intercultural dialogue and the articulation of traditional and 
scientific knowledge in Protected Area (PA) management, particularly related to fire 
management. More specifically, this has involved help with participatory historical 
reconstructions, territorial self-demarcation processes, and community reflection about socio-
ecological changes and a desired future. These activities have been decisive for the Pemon, 
revealing fire management knowledge that challenges conventional explanations of landscape 
change. This local knowledge, combined with results from studies of Pemon fire regimes, fire 
behavior ecology and paleo-ecological research, now inform a counter narrative of landscape 
change that is influencing a shift in environmental discourse and policy making towards an 
intercultural fire management approach (Rodríguez et al. 2013). 
 
3.4 Capabilities and recognition 
The capabilities approach argues that what is relevant for justice is whether individual 
persons as subjects of justice have the freedom to realise the objectives they have in life 
(Nussbaum 2007, Sen 1993, Sen 1999). In other words, the ‘good’ to which justice aspires is 
defined in terms of a person’s opportunities or ‘capabilities’ rather than their actual 
achievements (Sen 1999). Such capabilities are clearly dependent on a range of conditions, 
including economic distribution and cultural recognition. The capabilities approach has 
therefore provided environmental justice scholars with another way of framing links between 
distribution and recognition (an alternative to Fraser’s critical theory) (Martin et al. 2015, 
Schlosberg 2013).  
Whilst Sen and Nussbaum do not explicitly use the terminology of ‘recognition’, the 
capabilities approach offers a comprehensive view of the conditions needed for a good life 
that incorporates aspects of recognition, participation and distribution (Robeyns 2003, 
Schlosberg 2007, Schlosberg and Carruthers 2010). Nussbaum, for example, includes the 
requirement for people to have “the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation […] 
[which] entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, 
ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin” (Nussbaum 2007, 77).  
Whilst capabilities thinking stems from liberal individualism, environmental justice scholars 
have started to explore its potential to accommodate communitarian approaches to the 
subjects of social justice, for example through the idea of ‘community capabilities’ 
(Schlosberg and Carruthers 2010). The approach might also enable the inclusion of non-
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human capabilities (Nussbaum 2007, Schlosberg 2007). Nonhuman animals can evidently 
flourish or not flourish based on their capabilities, and this might serve as a basis for human 
duties towards them (Armstrong 2012, Cripps 2010). 
The nature of harms considered by capabilities thinkers is somewhat contested. A person 
who has fewer capabilities to accomplish what they reasonably value would be regarded as 
less well-off than others (Sen 2009, 231). In that sense, injustice is the denial of choice.  
However, there is less agreement about whether there are universal thresholds for certain 
capabilities that can serve as benchmarks for justice. It seems clear that some things are 
universally essential for a dignified life – sufficient food for example – and that failure to 
strive to provide these essentials will always be unjust. But going beyond examples like food 
and water becomes contentious (Gough 2004). Sen assumes a ‘thin universalism’: that 
beyond basic needs people will pursue different and context-specific ends (Sen 1993). In 
contrast, Nussbaum assumes a ‘thicker universalism’: there is a comprehensive set of 
capabilities that are essential for “a life that is worthy of the dignity of the human being” 
(Nussbaum 2007, 70).  
Even though there is this element of universalism, one of the important insights from 
capabilities thinking is the idea that what constitutes a meaningful life for an individual will 
not be predominantly universal, but mediated by various social and cultural values. Identity is 
viewed as complex, multiple and dynamic, such that attempts to reduce people’s values to a 
simple, collective label are seen as ‘the appalling miniaturisation of people’ (Sen 2007). 
Whilst the capabilities approach does not directly describe mechanisms of injustice (it is not 
a theory as such), it is implied that injustice arises from forms of governance and democracy 
that lead to such miniaturisation. In terms of responses, justice requires that individual 
humans (and perhaps communities and non-humans) be granted the political conditions that 
enable them to live the lives that they choose as meaningful. This is an everyday 
confrontation for the conservation sector because maintaining biodiversity and ecological 
processes is intimately entwined with, and can often conflict with, valued ways of life 
(Holland 2007, 2014, Polishchuk and Rauschmayer 2012, Sikor et al. 2014). Our third case 
study illustrates the ways in which policies to promote biodiversity conservation often form 
part of wider land management and development strategies, such as farming intensification, 
rural modernisation and formalisation of rights, which are ultimately assimilationist and 
conflict with alternative ways of knowing and living with nature. 
  
Case Study 3:  The Twa people and misrecognition in Rwanda 
In Rwanda, a small and densely populated country, only a few isolated areas of natural forest 
remain. Strict conservation through PAs has occurred with some benefits for all interest 
groups, but with some negative impacts felt locally. In particular, the indigenous Twa people 
inhabited Rwanda’s forests into the late 20th century and strict forest protection stripped 
them of culturally valued resources and livelihood choices, forcing incorporation into 
mainstream society and occupations (Beswick 2011). Subsequently many Twa find 
themselves landless, relying on extremely low paid agricultural labouring (Dawson and 
Martin 2015). The costs of conservation interventions can be seen to have denied many Twa 
adequate nutrition as well as the ability to live according to their culturally valued practices. 
The harms that have been imposed are produced concurrently by injustices of distribution and 




Iris Marion Young (2010) describes how discrimination tends to have both institutional roots 
in the formal apparatus of states, as well as more diffuse cultural roots. This is clearly the 
case for Rwanda’s Twa people. Post-genocide, Rwanda has been governed with very limited 
tolerance of parallel institutions to suit alternative cultural preferences. Ethnic reconciliation 
has been enshrined in law to redefine all as Rwandans (Purdeková 2008) and to forbid use of 
ethnic labels (Waldorf 2011).  The Twa are no longer to be called the Twa, but the 
‘historically marginalised people of Rwanda’. Institutional failures of recognition are 
matched by widespread cultural discrimination that contributes to the low status suffered by 
the Twa. 
Whilst manufactured blindness to ethnic or cultural groups may constitute a recognition 
injustice, so too might the collapsing (miniaturisation) of individuals into simplified group 
identities. Identities rarely remain unaltered and boundaries between interacting groups are 
not fixed, but complex and dynamic (Bierschenk 1988). Although groups with different 
cultural values can be identified in Rwanda based on their origin and history, distinctions 
between the three broad ethnic labels (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) as farmers, pastoralists or forest-
dwellers are often crude simplifications (Pottier 2002) and also overlook considerable intra-
group variation. For example some Twa may highlight cultural links to forests, while others 
have lived whole lives next to forests but pursued completely unrelated livelihoods. In line 
with Sen’s liberal pluralism, this necessitates a multifaceted approach to understanding and 
responding to recognition injustices. In the case of the Twa, responses to address issues of 
recognition may need not only to be attentive to cultural differences and restorative in nature 
but also to attend to the varied and changing aspirations expressed. 
Attention to recognition poses a challenge to how conservation can seek to offset costs with 
benefits. In Rwanda, a small proportion of tourism revenues are provided, in kind, to local 
inhabitants, in addition to some employment and income generating opportunities. However 
these benefits don’t always reach those whose choices have been most curtailed and are at 
any rate not always commensurable with what has been lost. Benefits are geographically 
concentrated in areas with greatest infrastructure and accrue almost exclusively to the 
wealthiest, whether as jobs, livestock or establishment of farming cooperatives (Dawson and 
Martin 2015). A Twa community living adjacent to one forest they had previously inhabited 
were granted ‘traditional’ costumes to perform dances for tourists and earn an income. In the 
absence of alternatives such opportunities are well received, but some Twa say they would 
prefer interventions that address their inequality of status, to provide an opportunity to reduce 
the everyday ethnic discrimination that they suffer. For example they would value training 
that enabled them to work and to manage their own money and cooperatives.  
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
Hvalkof (2000) catalogues a history of atrocities against peoples of the upper Amazon. He 
finishes with a warning that if conservationists arrive in this landscape determined to impose 
their particular ways of valuing and governing nature, then they are really not much better 
than the oil and rubber barons who have come before. Such a caution applies as much to 
global institutions as it does to field level operations. As Escobar (1999) argues, forums such 
as the CBD can be vital spaces for opening up intercultural dialogue or they can be 
dominated by western knowledge and agendas. Our empirical cases illustrate that such 
tensions between the potential costs and benefits of conservation are very much alive. PAs 
may help to protect much that is dear to the Pemon people in Venezuela and the Twa in 
Rwanda, but perversely, conservation has also become a threat to their existence as 
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indigenous peoples. The case of ABP in France, however, suggests that the science of 
(agro)biodiversity conservation can also be part of a dialogue between different ways of 
doing and knowing conservation, which, when community-driven, can help to oppose the 
institutional threats to their knowledge and livelihoods.   
There are some important differences between the theories of recognition that we have 
outlined here and summarised in Table 1. For Hegelian scholars recognition requires self-
development and affirmative multiculturalism as methods to seek mutual recognition; for 
critical theorists it requires institutional and structural reforms to bring about status equality; 
for decolonialists, a key priority is to vindicate ‘other’ non-modern conceptions of life that 
have been denied by enfoldment into western knowledge systems; for capabilities thinkers, 
the conditions for human freedom will require liberal deliberative democracy. There are also 
similarities, however. When focused on the conservation sector, all of these theoretical and 
political lenses suggest the need to strive for more equitable spaces of engagement. The 
responsibility to do this stems from the responsibility to prevent harm and to strive to ensure 
people have the capabilities to live in dignity. This responsibility extends to governments, 
NGOs and the wider public who support and benefit from conservation. As Young (2010) 
suggests, responsibility is not evenly distributed but falls more to those in a position of power 
to effect change, and those who have the privilege of benefiting from conservation whilst not 
being exposed to the corresponding costs.  
Whilst we are not in a position to provide detailed guidelines as to how to enact these 
responsibilities, we think that the ideas discussed in this paper provide robust theoretical 
support for some actions. First and foremost, there is a need to move beyond a distributive 
model of thinking about the social benefits and costs of conservation. A distributive 
analytical approach is important and can provide real insights into failures of recognition. For 
example, quantitative studies of the distribution of costs of toxic pollutants in the US revealed 
underlying causes in status inequalities linked to race and class (Warren 1999) and studies of 
the displacement of people for conservation emphasise the historical burden suffered by 
indigenous peoples (Dowie 2009). But the theories of recognition reviewed here also reveal 
the limitations of a distributive model and, in doing so, identify categories of concern that 
require additional coverage.  
Secondly, building on this point, the social impacts of conservation are in large part 
relational, whether this is taken in a Hegelian sense that inequitable relationships constitute 
the harm itself, or more in line with feminist, critical and decolonial scholars, that this is part 
of a broader structuring of social relations that produces low status for some groups. We 
therefore need to explore and develop analytical and practical ways to pursue relational 
aspects of environmental justice.  
Thirdly, as we develop practices that attend to these relational concerns, we can be guided by 
the concerns over the status of peasant cultures and knowledge worldwide, which are central 
to both the threats and opportunities that biodiversity conservation brings in our case studies. 
Whilst the CBD is committed to recognising different knowledge, it is clear that ways of 
working across alternative ways of perceiving and valuing nature are still not widely 
effective. As a first step, improving recognition is about acknowledging that conservation can 
produce these kinds of harms as well as providing opportunities for their alleviation. A 
second step involves changing power relations and moving towards relationships of more 
equal influence. For example, changing the legal and economic institutions to allow small 
farmers’ choice to engage in locally-valued land use practices, such as to plant the seeds they 
want, or changing the formal tenure of indigenous territories to enable local control over land 
use and political autonomy.  
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This brings us to the fourth and final requirement, namely that equitable influence over 
decision-making will rarely be served by use of pre-defined blueprints for biodiversity 
conservation, whether it be models for protected areas or market-based instruments. Such 
blueprints, such as the ‘ecosystem services’ model, are themselves institutionalisations of 
particular (western) ways of knowing and valuing nature and can act as barriers that prevent 
consideration of alternative knowledge and values. By contrast, practices such as the 
intercultural dialogue between external actors and the Pemon may help to open up the space 
for more genuine integration of conservation and development. We realise that such practices 
represent real challenges for field level conservation, in terms of resource constraints, 
methods and training, and in some cases political constraints. But if we are serious about the 
commitment for conservation to be equitable, engaging with issues of recognition is a 
necessary step to take. 
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